

27 December 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR: [REDACTED] Chief, Community Security Group

FROM: [REDACTED] Community Security Group

SUBJECT: Community aspects of DCI approved CIA security recommendations

REFERENCE: Your memo dated 12 Dec. 1978, Subject: Revision of compartmentation programs.

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1. This provides my comments on Intelligence Community aspects of the DCI approved recommendations on CIA security programs. This responds to referenced memorandum.

2. I see the following individual recommendations from the CIA package as being of actual or potential applicability to the Community. A plan of action is provided for those recommendations which I believe should be followed up on by the Security Committee.

a. Recommendation 4 - I strongly agree that re-investigation at the end of a probationary period is a very sound security objective for all Community personnel with access to classified intelligence information. But what works for CIA may not necessarily be applicable to other Community agencies. Questions to be dealt with in that regard include duration of probationary period for employees in other agencies; extent of rights of such employees to conversion to career status; and degree to which Civil Service rules permit security considerations to govern the continued employability of a person. I recommend that the Personnel and Industrial Branch be tasked to explore these questions. If such exploration indicates opportunity for us to provide guidance to the Community, I would recommend that the same branch be tasked to develop a reinvestigation proposal for Community implementation. I would suggest

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that the package provide for a strict timetable requiring that probationary employees be the subjects of a fitness report completed not less than 120 days prior to the end of their probationary period; and that the immediate supervisor of each such employee be interviewed by counterintelligence/investigative personnel on or about the same time with regard to employee behavior and conduct with emphasis on suitability indicators, attitude towards agency administrative rules, and degree of compliance with security requirements. I would further suggest that, depending on the period of time between the employee's EOD and the screening program addressed here, that at least a check of FBI records and of the police department which covers the area of employee residence be made to identify any pertinent data. When a probationary period is at least two years long, I would suggest that a partial reinvestigation covering more than the FBI and police checks above be completed. The scope of such reinvestigation should be governed by the findings of the DCID 1/14 study. Finally, I would recommend that the employee fitness reports, supervisory interview results, and reinvestigation data be screened by an agency board chaired by an experienced security officer and including representation from the agency's personnel office, the employing component, and, where applicable, other elements such as medical staff. I would suggest that the primary recommendation on continued employment in a position involving access to classified intelligence be made by the security officer, with any dissents by the other representatives being filed concurrently. Decision on such recommendation should be made by a senior agency official designated by the SIO involved. Since only CIA and NSA have authority to use the polygraph, there is no point in mentioning it for agencies other than NSA. I would recommend that NSA be encouraged to use the polygraph in screening probationers.

b. Recommendation 5 - I support the objective of better investigative coverage of industrial contractor employees with access to classified intelligence information. However, some questions need to be answered before a proposal to that end is submitted to the Intelligence Community. First, to what extent does E.O. 10865 preempt any authority the DCI may wish to exert in this area? (That Order generally puts industrial security

matters under the jurisdiction of the Department of Defense.) Second, hadn't we better get the results of the DCID 1/14 survey for use as a base before we develop proposed industrial personnel security standards? Third, shouldn't we make a rough estimate of the costs of our proposal before we send it out to see that it is economically realistic to the point where it will receive a proper hearing? I recommend that these matters be referred to the Personnel and Industrial Security Branch for resolution, and subsequent development of a proposal for Community consideration.

c. Recommendation 13 - I strongly support this objective. The criteria needed for use in identifying what qualifies for what level of classification will be influenced by the efforts of the [ ] Group. Fundamentally, this matter involves DCI guidance to the Community for the implementation of E.O. 12065. The classification guide approach inherent here is likely to meet the same objections as was the case for our earlier efforts with [ ] subcommittee. Notwithstanding, I recommend we proceed vigorously as soon as [ ] people have some draft criteria. That part of the CIA recommendation calling for strict accountability for all Top Secret material could serve well as leading the Community to meaningful acceptance of the basic criteria. If the DCI directed strict controls for all Top Secret documents, there would be a strong incentive to limit the amount of material classified at that level. I recommend that this matter be referred to the Compartmentation Branch for preparation of proposed Community guidance and policy.

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d. Recommendation 14 - same comments and recommendation as for number 13.

e. Recommendation 15 - This is readily applicable to the Community as written. A good vehicle for promulgating this as policy would be when the [ ] Group recommendations are published. I recommend that this matter be referred to the Compartmentation Branch.

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f. Recommendation 16 - The CIA recommendation was overtaken by E.O. 12065 which requires (Section 5-404(d)) agencies to establish programs to encourage and deal with

challenges by "agency personnel." The implementing directive for the E.O. elaborates on this (Section V). What I believe we should consider for the Community is DCI policy providing for challenges throughout the Community (e.g., making it possible for a DIA analyst to challenge a CIA classification). The risk in this is that the Security Committee staff could well end up holding the bag in terms of monitoring and supporting the challenge system. I recommend that the Compartmentation Branch be tasked to review this matter in the light of findings by the  Group.

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g. Recommendation 17 - I don't see this as meaningfully applicable to the Community until and unless we can show that there is a clear need for such in agencies other than CIA. I recommend we not pursue this further at this time.

h. Recommendation 19 - This strikes me as better meriting follow-up than recommendation 17. I recommend that the Compartmentation Branch be tasked to survey the Community to determine if there is a need for standardized, formal training as indicated in the CIA paper. If the answer is yes, then the same branch should be tasked to develop a proposal for DCI issuance (perhaps with assistance from the Security Awareness Working Group on proven means of getting people's attention with a necessary security message).

i. Recommendation 21 - This is a laudable objective, but one which may be more than a little difficult to enforce for senior levels which normally have the most sensitive information. There is a cost benefit to such action as well, arising from precluding the use of office copiers for large quantities of personal papers. There are negative costs involved in dedicating personnel to operate such machines (e.g., if an operator isn't available when a "rush" job comes along, users are going to look for shortcuts) and keep the necessary records, etc. I suggest we move carefully in this area, first attempting to identify where the Community is with regard to controls over reproduction. I recommend that a new working group of the SECOM be established to explore this subject and prepare recommendations for action.

j. Recommendation 22 - This amplifies recommendations No. 13 with specifics on how documents should be controlled and accounted for. I question whether this is a realistic goal for the Community given the need of analysts, managers and policy personnel to have direct access at their desks to controlled documents. Perhaps the way to deal with that would be to require that all controlled documents disseminated for immediate use be returned to registries 90 days after receipt and thereafter used only in registries or charged out on receipts with short due dates. Since this goal would be affected by the availability of reproduction facilities, etc., I recommend that this issue be explored and dealt with by the same working group suggested in subparagraph "i" above.

k. Recommendation 23 - This relates closely to recommendations 13 and 14. This is a good objective, but it is highly doubtful that it can be meaningfully applied to the vast body of existing SCI classified at the Top Secret level. Perhaps a grandfather clause will be needed. A spot inventory of a relatively small percentage of existing documents would be useful and practicable, however. While the findings of the [ ] Group will affect our action on this matter, I would recommend that the working group suggested above be tasked to deal with this as well as the related issues of document control (perhaps we could call it the SECOM Document Control Working Group?).

1. Recommendation 25 - I defer to the Computer Security Subcommittee for suggestions on this.

3. In terms of priority of effort, I believe we must give first attention to those areas which have been tasked to the [ ] Group or which are clearly affected by what that group does.

